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Taiwan The Case of Donald Keyser and Taiwan's National Security
Bureau
Author: Stéphane Lefebvre
DOI: 10.1080/08850600701249832
Publication Frequency: 4 issues per year
Published in: International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, Volume 20, Issue 3 September 2007 , pages 512 - 526
Introduction
After the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and adopted its one-China policy, Congress
enacted the U.S.-Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8), which
authorizes the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations
between the United States and Taiwan, but not diplomatic relations. The
policy has stood the test of time. Twenty-eight years later, the United
States still opposes Taiwan's independence and seeks to prevent the PRC
or Taiwan from conquering the other, favoring a peaceful resolution to
their conflict. But many U.S. officials reportedly consider the
relationship with China to be far more important than the one with
Taiwan, mainly because of the PRC's current and future place and
political influence in the world.1 Yet, not every U.S. official
privately shares this view, and knowing that would certainly be of
concern to Taiwan, always interested in any shift in U.S. policy. This
is the broad context within which the case of Donald Keyser unfolded
between 2004 and 2006.
AN UNAUTHORIZED SIDE TRIP
On 15 September 2004, the U.S. government arrested, on the basis of a
criminal complaint filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Donald Willis Keyser, a reputed expert on China then serving as
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
at the Department of State. The complaint revealed that Keyser, a fluent
Mandarin speaker, had allegedly concealed a September 2003 visit to
Taipei, Taiwan, by not listing it on a U.S. Customs Declaration form,
and making a false statement about the trip on his security
reinvestigation form in May 2004, a violation of Title 18 United States
Code, Section 1001(a) (see Box 1) punishable by fine or imprisonment (up
to five years and $250,000, respectively) or both. He was released that
same day on a $500,000 bond, co-signed by his wife, Margaret Lyons,2 and
required to surrender his passport and wear a monitoring bracelet. On 2
October Keyser's appearance before the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, during which he was supposed to be
formally indicted, was cancelled and the indictment set for no later
than 12 November as a result of a motion jointly filed by goverment
prosecutors and Keyser's attorney. The motion had successfully argued
that more time was needed by government prosecutors to review the
documents and computer records obtained after the execution of a search
warrant.3 Box 1 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 47, §1001
§1001. Statement or Entries Generally
Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001001
- 000-.html
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding,
or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or
documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in
that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the
legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to -
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter
related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or
employment practices, or support services, or a document required by
law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office
or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
Keyser had stopped in Taiwan while on an official tour to China and
Japan. He had departed for China on 31 August 2003, and from there to
Tokyo on 2 September. Before coming back to the United States on 7
September, Keyser stopped in Taipei for three days, arriving on the 3rd
and departing for Tokyo on the 6th. During the stopover in Taipei,
Keyser met with Chen Nien-tse (better known as Isabelle Cheng),4 a
33-year-old female junior officer of Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB)
assigned to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO)
in Washington, D.C., who had traveled to Taipei via Los Angeles on 30
August 2003. Cheng apparently took Keyser sightseeing. To conceal his
trip to Taiwan from the State Department, Keyser reported that the
persons he had planned to meet in Japan were no longer available, and,
rather than coming back to the United States immediately, he had decided
to take three days of vacation time, from 3 September to 6 September, in
Tokyo instead. Had Keyser sought permission to stop in Taiwan, his
request would have been turned down by his superior, Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, as the
United States did not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Keyser's unauthorized trip to Taiwan was later confirmed through
background credit checks which revealed he had used his credit card for
purchases made in Taiwan, including $570.01 at a Christian Dior store.
WASHINGTON COMPANIONSHIP
Following his return to Washington from Taipei, Keyser was seen on
several occasions with Cheng. At times, these ventures included the
NSB's highest-ranking officer in Washington, Lieutenant General Huang
Kuang-hsun (better known as Michael Huang).5 At many of these meetings,
Keyser was observed giving or showing them different pieces of
documentation. Keyser never reported his encounters with these two
foreign officials to his superior or any of his colleagues. On 4
September 2004, only a few days after Keyser's resignation from the
State Department, the FBI stopped the three of them coming out of a
restaurent. Cheng agreed to be searched. The FBI recovered the six-page
document that Keyser had given her during the lunch, which was titled
"Discussion Topics-September 04, 2004," and later determined to be
derived from material that was available to Keyser at the State
Department. He admitted to FBI agents of having given the document to
Cheng and Huang, and that he would often write talking points for his
meetings with them, both of whom he knew to be NSB officers. He further
acknowledged having met Cheng in Taipei and not having informed anyone
about his visit there - a severe lack of judgment, as it could have
possibly exposed Keyser to later blackmail by the NSB.6 Yet, neither the
criminal complaint against Keyser nor the FBI affidavit supporting it
made mention that Keyser had provided any classified information to the
NSB or that he had accepted anything in return. The relationship between
Keyser and Cheng, to the extent there could have been one, was not fully
substantiated either. Cheng, a divorcee and political science graduate
from National Taiwan University, had gone to New York by train with
Keyser on 29 May 2004. Although considered a junior officer in the NSB,
Cheng had served in the United Kingdom before her posting to the United
States.7 Revealed later was the fact that Cheng was engaged to, and
living with, a British journalist when she started meeting with Keyser.
MISHANDLED DOCUMENTS AND A PLEA BARGAIN
On 4 September, the day Keyser was apprehended, the FBI searched his
residence in Fairfax Station, Virginia, where they found 3,659 hard copy
and electronic documents classified Top Secret (28), Secret (1,976), and
Confidential, dating from 1980 to 2004.
Keyser, whose current (and fourth) wife is a Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) officer,8 had a diplomatic career spanning over thirty years, with
stints overseas in Beijing and Tokyo (see Box 2). In Washington, he saw
intelligence up close early on in his career and again in 1999-2000,
when he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
responsible for the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).
In 2000, however, he was suspended for thirty days and reassigned for
lax security over the loss of a laptop computer containing highly
classified information that involved five other State Department
employees. His suspension led to the resignation in protest - in the
form of early retirement - of his supervisor, INR Director J. Stapleton
Roy. Roy, who served as a U.S. Ambassador to China, would later write a
letter for the defense asking that Keyser be spared any jail time for
his actions.9 Keyser resigned from his position on 30 July 2004, and
subsequently entered a retirement course at the Foreign Service
Institute. His retirement became effective two months later, on 30
September.10 Box 2 Keyser's Career Path Timeline
Event
Sources: Press Release, The White House, 16 April 1999; Jerry Markon,
"Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says," The Washington Post, 16
September, 2004, p. A1; Criminal Complaint, Case 1:04M803, United States
District Court, Eastern Dictrict of Virginia, 15 September 2004.
1943 07 17
Born in Baltimore, Maryland
1965
B.A., Highest Honors, University of Maryland
1965-1966
Ph.D. studies
1968-1970
Stanford Inter-University Centre, Taiwan
1970-1972
Ph.D. studies (all requirements completed but the dissertation)
1972
Commissioned a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
1973-1975
China analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1976-1978
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1979-1981
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1981-1982
Special Advisor to Hawaii Governor Ariyoshi, State's Pearson Program
1982-1983
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1983-1985
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
1985-1988
Chief of the Political/External Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1988-1989
National War College, Class of 1989
1989-1992
Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1992-1993
Chaired studies of Japanese policy issues, Washington, D.C.
1993-1998
Successively Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau
of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Office Director, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Senior Inspector,
Office of Inspector General
1998-1999
Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States
Regional Conflicts
1999
Named by President Clinton for rank of Ambassador as Special Negotiator
for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999-2000
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR)
2000-2001
Office of the director general of the Foreign Service
2001-2003
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2003-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2004-09-30
Retired from the Senior Foreign Service
A former State Department and National Security officer, Jeff Bader, had
only good words for Keyser's abilities and loyalty to the United States:
"He is intellectually without peer. He knew more about the
U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship and how to navigate it than anybody I
know. I never heard a syllable out of him in 22 years that suggested
anything other than absolute loyalty and patriotism to the United
States. I can't accept the notion that he has done anything of the sort
that's implied."11 Taiwanese media speculations asserted that Keyser
might have had a sexual relationship with Cheng due to their frequent
encounters.12 While sexual entanglements are not unusual in U.S.
espionage cases,13 at the time of Keyser's arrest nothing seriously
indicated that his case was one of espionage or that it had a sexual
overtone.
On 12 December 2005, Keyser agreed to a plea agreement that would not
prevent him from keeping his federal pension.14 At paragraph 5 of his
plea, Keyser agreed to fully, truthfully, and completely cooperate with
the government regarding any illegal or intelligence activities by
himself or others, to submit to polygraph examinations, and to admit to
the admissibility of the results of these examinations in any future
proceeding about his compliance with the plea agreement.
He told the court he was deeply ashamed of his actions, admitting to a
personal, but not to an explicit sexual relationship with Cheng, and
pleaded guilty to having made two false statements (denying a
relationship with Cheng which may have made him vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation or pressure from a foreign government, and not reporting
the trip to Taiwan, a violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1001(a))
(see Box 1), and having removed, without authorization, classified
documents from Department of State premises, a violation of Title 18,
U.S.C., Section 2071(b) (see Box 3). He explained that he had not wanted
his wife to discover his relationship with Cheng, known to him as a
declared NSB officer, and recognized that his wish to keep his
relationship with Cheng secret when it started in 2002 could have
resulted in his being blackmailed. He added, though, that he had neither
given any classified documents to Cheng for which Taiwan was not cleared
to receive, nor been blackmailed by the NSB. Box 3 Title 18, United
States Code, Part I, Chapter 101, §2071 §2071. Concealment, Removal, or
Mutilation Generally
Source:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002071 -
000-.html
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates,
obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so
takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper,
document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer
of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any
judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Box 4 The NSB
• Established on 1 March 1955, it is a subsidiary organ of the National
Security Council responsible with the overall management and
coordination of all security and intelligence activities, the planning
and execution of special missions, and the analysis of of national
strategic intelligence
• It acknowledges operating defensively and offensively at home and
abroad, using both human and technical intelligence means under strict
cover
• The Director General and his three Directors General lead and manage
six operational departments (International; Chinese mainland; operations
in the Taiwan region; analysis; security of scientific and technological
intelligence and communications; and development and control of codes
and related equipment), a Computer Center, a Secretariat, a General
Affairs Office, a Personnel Department, an Accounting Department, a
Department of Government and Ethics, a Telecommunications Technology
Center, a Training Center, and a Special Service Command Center
• By law, the NSB budget must remain confidential and its staff
apolitical. However, the NSB must submit an annual report to parliament
that summarizes its operations
Keyser's CIA wife, Margaret Lyons, who had known about her husband's
home collection of classified documents for about a year, did not have
her security clearance revoked by the Agency. On 22 February 2006, she
wrote a letter to the presiding judge in Keyser's case in which she
conceded her failure to properly secure the classified documents in her
husband's possession, as well as an unknown number of CIA documents she
herself was keeping at home without authorization.15
EVASIVE DEBRIEFINGS
After Keyser's plea agreement was finalized and accepted by the court,
the FBI and other government officials debriefed him four times over a
three-month period (January-March 2006), and asked him to submit to two
polygraph examinations - on 14 February and 5 April 2006. The
debriefings were not satisfactory. According to government prosecutors,
Keyser was not very cooperative, even evasive, and tried to conceal many
of the facts surrounding his intelligence and sexual relationships with
Cheng, his activities while visiting Taiwan, his stack of classified
documents at home, and his taking a laptop computer and classified
material while visiting China, Japan, and Taiwan in 2003. During his 18
January 2006 debriefing, he justified his meetings with Cheng and her
boss, Huang, as a way to better convey U.S. policy to Taiwan. He denied
helping Cheng in her intelligence duties, despite responding promptly to
her requests for information, giving her documents, and sending her many
e-mails about official U.S. government business - some of which Cheng
forwarded as part of "Secret" cables to the NSB's headquarters - asking
her not to attribute to him the origin of any information he passed
along, and acknowledging in e-mails that what he was doing would make
her indispensable to her agency. Cheng gave copies of these cables to
U.S. authorities on 4 September 2004. These cables indicate clearly that
Cheng considered Keyser an intelligence asset of value to the NSB, one
whose identity had to be protected from disclosure.16
During his first and second debriefings, Keyser was asked about an
e-mail he had sent to Cheng in which he identified a former State
Department official as a possible NSB recruiting target. In Keyser's
words, this person was
ripe for recruitment by careful, methodical, serious intelligence
agencies. In the days of the Cold War, Soviet and East German
intelligence officers were quite practiced at identifying people like
this, people who did not wake up one day and say "I want to be a
traitor" but people whose relatively minor weaknesses and ego
gratification needs make them potential targets.17
This official was identified by the defense as a Heritage Foundation
analyst, John Tkacik, who once headed the INR's China section. Keyser's
defense counsel, Robert Litt, said that Keyser's e-mail was simply a way
to discredit Tkacik's criticism of the U.S. envoy in Taiwan. Clearly
upset by Kaiser's comments, Tkacik was firm in saying he had never been
the subject of a recruitment effort by an intelligence service,
including Taiwan's.18
When debriefed about his trip to Taiwan in September 2003, Keyser denied
meeting with anyone else but Cheng or giving any classified information
to the NSB. Polygraphed on these two matters, he twice failed the
examination as deception was found. E-mails between Keyser and Cheng
also indicate that, during his debriefing sessions, he "had made false
and misleading statements about the timing of his decision to go to
Taiwan."19 He also denied being conscious of covering his tracks when
meeting with Cheng, although his actions, observed by an FBI
surveillance team or otherwise discovered during the investigation,
allegedly were akin to counterintelligence tradecraft. Forensic evidence
from his laptop indicates that Keyser had used it in China to access
eight classified files from floppy disks, and that he again used the
laptop while in Taiwan. When debriefed on this matter, he denied having
used a laptop in China or brought classified information with him on his
travels.
For all these reasons, on 29 June 2006 prosecutors motioned the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to find Keyser in
material breach of his plea agreement. One of the prosecutors told the
press that the action was necessary because Keyser had not respected his
part of the deal, and that his case was now espionage-related.
Sentencing was therefore postponed until a decision on the motion was
taken, and an evidentiary hearing held in camera to decide whether the
new classified information could lead to new charges or bolster the
government's case at sentencing.20
The next day, the court agreed to the government's motion to use
classified information to argue that Keyser was in breach of his plea
agreement, and to deny Keyser access to that information. But the judge
allowed a summary of the classified information to be provided to
Keyser's counsels, Robert Litt and Mara Senn. They responded two weeks
later with a motion of reconsideration because, in their opinion, not
permitting them and Keyser the opportunity "to review the full
underlying information would violate Mr. Keyser's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights and is inconsistent with the provisions of CIPA
[Classified Information Procedures Act]."21 In the memorandum supporting
their motion, the lawyers also disputed the most recent claims of the
government prosecutors. They asserted that Keyser's actions were in
support of U.S. foreign policy (even though the information he gave
Cheng was in response to her specific questions); that he had not given
her classified information; and that no harm resulted from his
relationship with her.22 On 5 July, the federal prosecutors had filed a
43-page memorandum in support of their motion, alleging that Keyser had
violated his plea agreement by not fully assisting the government's
damage assessment related to his actions, and for not having fully
disclosed his exact relationship with Cheng - which allegedly included
sexual activities, including twice in a parked vehicle. The filing
further alleged that Keyser was infatuated with Cheng, and that some of
his actions when meeting with her were tantamount to espionage
tradecraft. As for Cheng, she had married the journalist from The China
Post, Christopher Cockel, while meeting and allegedly having sex with
Keyser, thus suggesting that her motives might not have been innocent.
On 13 December 2006, prosecutors dropped their request to bring
additional charges against Keyser, thus putting an end to court
proceedings until Keyser's sentencing, set for 22 January 2007. In their
court filing, they mentioned that Keyser had been debriefed again the
preceding day, but revealed no details.23
TAIWAN'S REACTIONS
In the days following Keyser's indictment, the NSB reportedly recalled
home several intelligence officers from the United States, but not Cheng
and Huang, who were said to be cooperating with U.S. investigators. It
issued a press release stating that Taiwan and the United States were on
very friendly terms, and that the NSB's mission in the United States was
to understand the positions of the United States vis-à-vis Taiwan
through legal means rather than undercover operations. David Lee,
Taiwan's representative in Washington, D.C., often repeated this message
in his dealings with U.S. officials. Notwithstanding, a senior Taiwanese
official suggested at the time of Keyser's arrest that his country's
intelligence personnel and their activities in the United States would
be reviewed and readjusted in light of the charges against Keyser.24
Because the case surfaced at a time when the NSB was concerned about
internal leaks, the media quickly surmised, with the help of unnamed
inside sources, that the U.S.'s detailed knowledge of Keyser's visit to
Taipei could have been the result of further leaks, or even a
penetration of the NSB by the United States.25
Taiwan's Premier Yu Shyi-kun and Foreign Minister Mark Chen were very
clear in their respective statements to Parliament and the media that
Washington-based NSB officers had not done anything illegal and that
their government would cooperate with the United States in getting to
the bottom of the affair. Chen also directly communicated this message
to U.S. officials during a late September 2004 stopover in Baltimore,
where he was hosting a conference.26
Michael Huang was replaced ten months later by a newly appointed NSB
deputy director and former president of the Chinese Military Academy,
Lieutenant General Yang Kuo-Chiang, a high-ranking official without
intelligence experience, to signal to the U.S. how important Taiwan
values their bilateral relationship.27 Yang was indeed an appropriate
choice; he had lived and studied in the U.S. and already had numerous
government contacts. His lack of intelligence experience would also
signal that he was not coming over to satisfy any NSB operational
requirements. Upon returning to Taipei, Huang briefly took over a deputy
director position before retiring by year's end. As for Isabelle Cheng,
she returned to Taipei some time in 2005.28
After the U.S. government alleged that Keyser had not respected his plea
agreement, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted cautiously,
noting it would be following the development of the case and assess its
impact once it was finally dealt with. In the meantime, bilateral ties
between Taiwan and the United States had not reportedly been affected
and were continuing normally.29 But this continuity did not last very
long. In August, TECRO motioned the courts for a return of the documents
that Cheng had provided the FBI after Keyser was detained in 2004, and
that no use be made of them by the U.S. authorities. But TECRO's request
that its motion be treated as secret was rejected, thus exposing the
policy change on its cooperation with U.S. authorities on the Keyser
case.30 The U.S. Justice Department opposed TECRO's motion, agreeing
only to give TECRO copies of the original documents, because these could
be used as evidence in a criminal trial.31 The matter became moot as a
result of the December 2006 decision by prosecutors not to proceed to
criminal trial on espionage charges.
On Monday, 22 January 2007, Federal Judge Thomas Ellis of Alexandria,
Virginia, sentenced Keyser to one year and one day in jail, two years of
supervised release, and payment of a fine of $25,000 on charges of
having kept thousands of classified documents at his home and for lying
about his relationship with Cheng. In a written statement, Chuck
Rosenberg, the U.S. Attorney overseeing the case, claimed that Keyser
"had an absolute obligation to safeguard the classified information
entrusted to him and utterly failed to do so. His sentence of
imprisonment is a warning to others in positions of public trust."32
WHY WOULD TAIWAN NEED TO SPY ON THE UNITED STATES?
The Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to assist Taiwan with
the provision of articles and services "as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." U.S. officials
from time to time reiterate the point that this is not an open-ended
commitment to defend Taiwan if it were attacked. In fact, Taiwan has the
responsibility to reach an acceptable level of self-defense capability
before receiving U.S. assistance to maintain that level. In September
2005, Department of Defense official Edward Ross, Principal Director,
Operations Directorate, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, warned
Taiwan before the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council that "We cannot help
defend you, if you cannot defend yourself."33
As J. Peter Scoblic, the executive editor of The New Republic magazine,
has noted, Taiwan does not particularly trust the United States.
According to Scoblic,
The problem is that, while ostensibly committed to the island's defense,
the United States is also clearly committed to improving relations with
China. When the United States steps too close to the mainland - as when
[President George] Bush told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last December
[2003] that he opposed Taiwanese moves toward formal independence -
Taipei gets anxious. So Taiwan might very well spy on us to learn how
far toward independence it could go without loosing U.S. support and at
what point it could expect help from Washington, should Beijing become
aggressive.34
An editorial in the Taipei Times makes a similar argument:
We do not know if Keyser was in fact spying for Taiwan. But we can say
that it is hard to blame Taiwan if he was. When the staff of the foreign
ministry of the world's hyperpower [the State Department] is virtually
unanimous in its opposition to your interests, it is certainly useful to
know exactly who is saying what to whom.35
Taiwan's Law for National Intelligence Operations specifies at Article 7
that the intelligence collected, analyzed, and used by Taiwan's
intelligence organizations falls into three categories: (1) mainland or
foreign information that involves national security or interests; (2)
information concerning civil strife, treason, leakage of national
secrets, foreign spies, enemy spies, transnational crimes, and
infiltration and sabotage activities by external and internal
terrorists; and (3) other information concerning the overall national
situation, national defense, foreign affairs, cross-strait relations,
economy, science and technology, social situations, or major public
offenses. This intelligence is gathered in a variety of ways, including
an engagement "in aggressive intelligence-gathering within the United
States."36
Taiwan's ability to defend itself in case of an attack by the PRC is far
from certain, and is dependent to a large extent on U.S. assistance,
which Taiwanese often doubt because of the importance the U.S. accords
to its relationship with the PRC. Having key national interests at
stake, the NSB would, not surprisingly, attempt to supplement any
information received by Taiwan through official diplomatic channels with
their own. In Keyser's case, it seems clear that he was being exploited
by Isabelle Cheng for her own benefit and that of the NSB. But the NSB's
Headquarters in Taipei does not seem to have been overly proactive in
directing Cheng in her relationship with Keyser. Otherwise, Cheng would
not have noted repeatedly in her messages back to HQ that they had to
protect her source (Keyser). Strangely, she did not even use a codename
or a file number to refer to him in these messages.
THE DANGER OF FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS
The Donald Keyser case has once again highlighted the fact that the
control, handling, and storage of classified information at both the
State Department and the CIA are in need of closer monitoring and
review. Keyser and his wife, Margaret Lyons, were the recipients of
highly classified documents, and obviously have not been made to fully
account for their ultimate disposition. Keyser accumulated such
documents over a very long period, while gaining in professional rank
and responsibility. Due to their long experience in government and
within the Intelligence Community, no satisfactory excuse for their
behavior exists. The question is: How many other State officials
routinely bring home classified documents without proper approval and
filling the necessary paperwork? Perhaps spot checks of briefcases when
State Department employees leave the premises would deter other
officials from "pulling a Keyser."
The case also illustrates the validity of policies concerning the
reporting of unofficial or opportune contacts with foreign officials, or
personal relationships with foreign citizens, for U.S. government
officials enjoying access to classified information. Keyser was
obviously aware of these policies, but purposefully chose to ignore them
and conceal his behavior. Had he followed the rules applying to him from
the very beginning, he might not be in jail today.
The presence of NSB officers Cheng and Huang in the United States had
been declared to U.S. authorities, and was part and parcel of the
"unofficial" relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The
posting of declared intelligence officers between friendly countries is
routine, and brings with it the expectation that they not engage in
covert intelligence-gathering operations without the consent of the host
country. Judging from what is known, Donald Keyser seems to have been a
target of opportunity who presented himself vulnerably due to his
infatuation with Cheng. Or did Isabelle Cheng purposefully target him
after spotting his fondness for her? The truth may never be known.
REFERENCES
1. - U.S. Department of State Press Statement 2006/104, "Taiwan-U.S.
Policy," Washington, D.C., 30 January 2006; David Momphard, "Taiwan's
Fickle Friend," Taipei Times, 10 October 2004, p. 17
2. http://www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/AsiaSoc2002.pdf —
According to the appearance bond, both live at the same address in
Fairfax Station, Virginia. In 2002, 2003, and 2004, Keyser and Lyons
jointly donated between $100–$149 to the Asia Society according to the
organization's Annual Report 2002,
http//www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/AsiaSoc2002.pdf, Annual
Report 2003, http://asiasociety.com/visit/washingtondc/2003annrpt.pdf,
and Annual Report 2004,
http://www.asiasociety.org/visit/washingtondc/2004annrpt.pdf
3. Snyder, Charles (2004) Charges on Keyser are Postponed. Taipei Times
p. 3.
4. (2004) Mystery Taiwan Woman in US Spy Storm Named. Straits Times —
Her identity was revealed in Lawrence Chung
5. — His identity was revealed in Lawrence Chung, “Mystery Taiwan Woman
in US Spy Storm Named.”
6. Calabresi, Massimo (2004) Error of Judgment.
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040927-699471,00.html
Time Asia — accessed at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/article/0,13673,501040927-699471,00.html
[pubmed]
7. Chung, Lawrence — Mystery Taiwan Woman in US Spy Storm Named.
8. Morello, Carol (2004) Arrest Shocks Former State Department
Colleagues. The Washington Post p. A8.
9. Gertz, Bill and Scarborough, Rowan (2000) Inside the Ring.
http://www.computerworld.com The Washington Times — Jerry Markon,
“Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says,” The Washington Post, 16
September 2004, p. A1; Sean Paige, “Waste & Abuse,” Insight Magazine,
January 2001, accessed at http//www.insightmag.com; Dan Verton, “State
Department to Punish 6 Over Missing Laptop,” Computer World, 6 December
2000, accessed at http://www.computerworld.com; Josh Gerstein, “Heritage
Foundation Official Fingered as Possible Spy Recruit,” The Washington
Times, 14 August 2006
10. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps — “Employment Status of Donald W.
Keyser,” Taken Question 2005/1162 (Question Taken at 12 December 2005
Daily Press Briefing), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Spokesman, 12 December 2005, accessed at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps on 12 December 2005
11. Morello, Carol — Arrest Shocks Former State Department Colleagues
12. Chung, Lawrence (2004) US ‘May Be Using Spy Scandal As Warning,’.
Strait Times
13. (2005) Sex Again: The Smith-Leung Spy Case. International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 18:2 , pp. 296-304. - See, inter
alia, Stéphane Lefebvre [informaworld]
14. Seper, Jerry (2005) Ex-aide Pleads Guilty at State. The Washington
Times — Josh Meyer, “Ex-Official Admits Wrongdoing, Not Espionage,” The
Los Angeles Times, 13 December 2005; Charles Snyder, “Keyser Offers
Guilty Plea to US Court,” Taipei Times, 14 December 2005, p. 1
15. Burger, Timothy J. and Zagorin, Adam A Steamy Spy Scandal at the
State Department. http://www.time.com Time Magazine — posted on 15 July
2006 at http://www.time.com
16. pp. 13–18. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in
Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its
Plea Obligations, Crim. No. 1:05CR543, Alexandria, United States
District Court for Eastern District of Virgina, filed on 5 July 2006
17. p. 19. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in
Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its
Plea Obligations
18. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Heritage Foundation Official Fingered as
Possible Spy Recruit. The Washington Times
19. pp. 24–25. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in
Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its
Plea Obligations
20. Barakat, Matthew p. 1. — “U.S. Prosecutors Seek Withdrawal from Plea
Deal with Diplomat,” Associated Press, 26 June 2006, accessed at
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/detail.asp?ID=84745&GRP=B on 26 June
2006; Charles Snyder, “Keyser to Face Spy Charges, US Prosecutors Say,”
Taipei Times, 25 June 2006
21. — Motion for Reconsideration of Order Approving Substitution Under
Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act, Crim. No.
1:05cr543, Alexandria, United States District Court for Eastern District
of Virginia, 14 July 2006
22. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Official at Center of Taiwanese Spying Probe
Cries Foul. The New York Sun [crossref]
23. Gerstein, Josh (2006) U.S. Drops Plans for More Charges In Taiwan
Spy Case. The New York Sun [crossref]
24. Chieh-yu, Lin (2004) Officials Pull Spy Team from US. Taipei Times
p. 3. — “Taiwan Won't Recall Intelligence Agents,” Associated Press, 20
September 2004; Chris Cockel, “Intelligence Officers Urge
Understanding,” China Post, 14 October 2004
25. Chieh-yu, Lin (2004) NSB Expects Probe over Diplomat Flap. Taipei
Times p. 1.
26. Chen, Melody (2004) Visit Unrelated to Keyser Flap: Chen. Taipei
Times p. 1. — Reuters, “Taiwan Says Security Officers Did Not Hurt U.S.
Ties,” 27 September 2004
27. Ming-chieh, Wu (2005) Chung-Kuo Shih Pao
28. Ming-chieh, Wu (2005) Truth of Keyser Case Comes Out. Chung-Kuo
Shih-Pao — Wu Ming-Chieh, “Repairing Damage from Keyser Case,
Reestablishing Mutual Trust,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, 25 July 2005
29. (2006) MOFA Hopes Keyser Case Won't Harm Washington Ties.
http//english.www.gov.tw Taiwan Headlines — accessed at
http//english.www.gov.tw on July 19, 2006
30. Gerstein, Josh (2006) In a Reversal, Taiwan Officials Seek to Block
U.S. Spy Investigation. The Washington Times
31. Gerstein, Josh (2006) Justice Dept. Aims To Block Taiwan Spy Probe.
The New York Sun [crossref]
32. Gerstein, Josh (2007) Jail Sentence For Diplomat In Spy Case. The
New York Sun p. 1.
33. Ross, Edward (2005) Remarks before the U.S.–Taiwan Business
Council-Defense Industry Conference 2005 p. 5. — see also, Simon
Tisdall, “US goes on attack over Taiwan's defence,” Guardian Weekly, 28
October–3 November 2005, p. 5
34. Scoblic, J. Peter (2004) When Allies Steal Secrets. The Los Angeles
Times
35. (2004) U.S.: Know Where Your Interests Lie. Taipei Times p. 8. —
Editorial
36. p. 13. — Memorandum in Support of Motion to Find Defendant in
Material Breach of Plea Agreement and to Release the Government from Its
Plea Obligations
List of Tables
Box 1 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 47, §1001 §1001.
Statement or Entries Generally
Source:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001001 -
000-.html
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully -
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding,
or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or
documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in
that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the
legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to -
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter
related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or
employment practices, or support services, or a document required by
law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office
or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
Box 2 Keyser's Career Path Timeline
Event
Sources: Press Release, The White House, 16 April 1999; Jerry Markon,
"Powell Aide Gave Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says," The Washington Post, 16
September, 2004, p. A1; Criminal Complaint, Case 1:04M803, United States
District Court, Eastern Dictrict of Virginia, 15 September 2004.
1943 07 17
Born in Baltimore, Maryland
1965
B.A., Highest Honors, University of Maryland
1965-1966
Ph.D. studies
1968-1970
Stanford Inter-University Centre, Taiwan
1970-1972
Ph.D. studies (all requirements completed but the dissertation)
1972
Commissioned a Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
1973-1975
China analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
1976-1978
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1979-1981
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1981-1982
Special Advisor to Hawaii Governor Ariyoshi, State's Pearson Program
1982-1983
U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1983-1985
Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
1985-1988
Chief of the Political/External Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan
1988-1989
National War College, Class of 1989
1989-1992
Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China
1992-1993
Chaired studies of Japanese policy issues, Washington, D.C.
1993-1998
Successively Director, Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, Bureau
of East Asia and Pacific Affairs; Office Director, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Senior Inspector,
Office of Inspector General
1998-1999
Special Negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States
Regional Conflicts
1999
Named by President Clinton for rank of Ambassador as Special Negotiator
for Nagorno-Karabakh and New Independent States Regional Conflicts
1999-2000
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR)
2000-2001
Office of the director general of the Foreign Service
2001-2003
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2003-02
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2004-09-30
Retired from the Senior Foreign Service
Box 3 Title 18, United States Code, Part I, Chapter 101, §2071 §2071.
Concealment, Removal, or Mutilation Generally
Source:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002071 -
000-.html
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates,
obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or, with intent to do so
takes and carries away any record, proceeding, map, book, paper,
document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer
of any court of the United States, or in any public office, or with any
judicial or public officer of the United States, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Box 4 The NSB
• Established on 1 March 1955, it is a subsidiary organ of the National
Security Council responsible with the overall management and
coordination of all security and intelligence activities, the planning
and execution of special missions, and the analysis of of national
strategic intelligence
• It acknowledges operating defensively and offensively at home and
abroad, using both human and technical intelligence means under strict
cover
• The Director General and his three Directors General lead and manage
six operational departments (International; Chinese mainland; operations
in the Taiwan region; analysis; security of scientific and technological
intelligence and communications; and development and control of codes
and related equipment), a Computer Center, a Secretariat, a General
Affairs Office, a Personnel Department, an Accounting Department, a
Department of Government and Ethics, a Telecommunications Technology
Center, a Training Center, and a Special Service Command Center
• By law, the NSB budget must remain confidential and its staff
apolitical. However, the NSB must submit an annual report to parliament
that summarizes its operations |
